EU Constitution: Austrian Presidency

Lord Henley: My Lords, if, as the Minister implies, the collection and storage of DNA samples will be of some use in catching criminals and preventing crime, it is presumably important to collect the samples from scenes of crime. Can she therefore give us some figures on what percentage of burglaries, for example, are properly investigated by scene-of-crime officers and what percentage of those investigations yield useful DNA samples?

Lord Soley: My Lords, is the time not right for a wide debate on the issue? I would not mind my DNA being on a national database. I agree that the issue of consent is vital, but we could go a long way towards preventing some of the rapes, murders and other particularly brutal crimes and identifying those people who decided to go on them if we were more willing to consider this as a national issue and one that we should all consider for the benefit of others. The civil liberties of those who are abused in some of the most appalling ways also ought to get a look-in on this argument.

Lord Harrison: My Lords, has my noble friend costed the burden of red tape that would fall on British business, were we to withdraw from the European Union and then be obliged to renegotiate 24 bilateral agreements with the other member countries of the European Union?

Lord Davies of Oldham: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.
	Moved, That it be an instruction to the Grand Committee to which the London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Bill has been committed that they consider the bill in the following order:
	Clauses 1 to 3
	Schedule 1
	Clauses 4 to 8
	Schedule 2
	Clauses 9 to 32
	Schedule 3
	Clause 33
	Schedule 4
	Clauses 34 to 42—(Lord Davies of Oldham.)

Baroness Williams of Crosby: I suggest that Members of this House look closely at Clause 17 in relation to the amendment to Clause 19, which I am moving. Clause 17 is an interesting part of the Bill because it extends the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom to cover offences committed outside this country, including offences that may be partially or wholly involved with another government—not our own. It then says that somebody can be prosecuted for an offence against another government if that would constitute an offence in this country. In other words, somebody who commits an offence abroad can be brought within the circumference of the English courts for the purposes of holding him responsible for that offence.
	Those of us who have read the measured and careful report of the Constitution Committee will have seen what I think is a thoughtful phrase, which is relevant to some of the Questions raised earlier. Paragraph 4 of the report states:
	"While anti-terrorist legislation is not new, each incremental instalment, generated by concern about public safety"—
	nobody questions the concern of Members of this House about public safety—
	"must be considered not only on its merits but in relation to the totality of such legislation".
	That is why we on these Benches are concerned about Clauses 17, 18 and 19, and why we have proposed the amendment.
	Clause 19(2) refers to an "offence under this Part" which,
	"has been committed for a purpose wholly or partly connected with the affairs of a country other than the United Kingdom".
	In other words the clause catches people who may not be bringing any kind of terrorist action against the United Kingdom. If Members of the House care to look at Clause 17, they will see how very wide the range of such offences is, covering attempts to commit an offence and incitement to commit an offence—the list is very broadly expressed.
	The purpose of the amendment, which has been carefully and cautiously phrased, is to indicate that when an offence is committed outside this country and partially or largely involves the government of another country, the Attorney-General, who is obliged to give permission for a prosecution in such a case, "shall have regard to"—not a very strong phrase—certain factors about that other government. In particular, the Attorney-General of the government of this country should have regard to whether that other government has been engaged in crimes against humanity.
	The offence of crimes against humanity is a relatively recent development. The more thoughtful, civilised and democratic members of the United Nations are trying to establish that some international crimes are so terrible and unspeakable that the global community should stand against them and condemn those responsible for them. I do not need to go much beyond the well known cases of Messrs Mladic, Karadzic and Milosevic in respect of the Federation of Yugoslavia, as it formerly was, and the dreadful case of Rwanda—to some extent, such cases were copied in Cambodia. Tragically, crimes against humanity are still very much part of our world and, so far, are not showing signs of being completely purged from it.
	This amendment, which is so cautiously expressed, leaves it to the Attorney-General to decide in the instance of an offence against another government whether he should have regard to—if you like, take into account—the behaviour of that government. The Government of the United Kingdom, which assert on many occasions their opposition to systematic torture and genocide and have signed the United Nations conventions on both, are clearly aligned with those who try to stop any approval of such crimes against humanity.
	Finally, we move from that to a rather more difficult example. Are those who use extra-parliamentary methods ever excusable? Our argument is that where they use extra-parliamentary methods because no parliamentary or constitutional channels are open to them and they have to take into account the behaviour of a government that do not listen to dissident, opposition or critical voices, that must be taken into account by the Attorney-General. I shall not bore the House by reciting yet again the long and brilliant tradition of this country in protecting dissidents from Garibaldi to members of the African National Congress because it believed that they were voices for freedom, civilisation and democracy against tyranny. However, that is a great tradition of this country and one of the proudest parts of our heritage.
	Although I recognise that this amendment is rather unusual and that, generally speaking, this House would be reluctant to adopt an amendment that has international repercussions, the point is that the rule of law now has international repercussions and cannot be constrained within the borders of a particular nation state. The purpose of this amendment it to make sure that the Attorney-General, in bearing in mind and having regard to this issue, will uphold the fine traditions of the United Kingdom with regard to governments that treat their citizens as if they are so many slaves. I beg to move.

Lord Judd: I urge my noble friend to give serious consideration to what the noble Baroness said and to treat her arguments as highly relevant to the reality of many situations. At home in my study, I have a photograph that I treasure. It is of Chief Lutuli receiving the telegram telling him that he was to receive the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to bring about change in South Africa by non-violent, passive means. As somebody who, as a younger Member of the other place, went through that period in political history, I can remember my tussles with my conscience on this issue. I came to the conclusion that while I could not personally embrace violence as a means of political change, I had to understand the position of the ANC because the outside world had totally failed Chief Lutuli and his fellow strugglers who used non-violent means.
	That is a real situation. My experiences in Chechnya have underlined the very same kind of point. I do not apologise for mentioning that again, although I seem to do so almost every time we turn to these matters. But it is not only in Chechnya or South Africa that this remains true. I make the point emphatically that some of us who take what the noble Baroness has said seriously do not endorse violence as a means to political change. But it is important to understand why some people in desperation feel they have no other course.
	I believe that this amendment has been carefully crafted. It simply puts in the Bill a requirement that the Law Officers who have to decide whether they will proceed with a case do seriously consider these matters. It does not make any particular course mandatory; it simply says that these matters must be seriously considered. It would be good, even at this stage, if the Government could consider that position carefully.
	Perhaps I may also say that I am a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and that we have had long deliberations on this Bill. At the outset of our report, we said that we believed that our Government's human rights responsibility was to protect the people of this country. We said that if, in the total effect of the proposals, a situation might inadvertently be made more dangerous rather than less dangerous, the Government would—albeit unintentionally, obviously— have failed to fulfil their human rights obligations because they had aggravated the situation. This issue of counter-productivity underlines many of the discussions on the Bill. It is one that profoundly preoccupies me. At times I almost think it preoccupies me more than the human rights and humanitarian arguments, because it is so central to our own well-being and safety.
	I simply suggest to my noble friend that if we cannot embrace what the noble Baroness has just argued, we cannot bring ourselves to understand seriously the real predicament in which some people in desperation sometimes find themselves, and we may well increase the number of people prepared to listen to the arguments of the extremists. In resisting the extremists, in winning the battle for hearts and minds, we have to fall over backwards to demonstrate consistency and a determination to uphold the values and principles of which compassion and understanding must be very central, and which are so important to our way of life. I believe the noble Baroness has put her case moderately. I believe the amendment is important. I urge my noble friend and her colleagues in government to give it very careful consideration.

Lord Judd: My Lords, that is a very fair question from my noble friend. We were fellow Ministers in the same Administration and I am sure that in his responsibilities for trade he took human rights as seriously as many of us at the Foreign Office did. We did indeed have many searching discussions about human rights in the Foreign Office at the time I was Minister. Under the urging of the Under-Secretary of State at the time, the late Evan Luard, we went through a period where—very much in keeping with many aspects of government policy these days—we required our ambassadors to assess regimes and governments abroad based on a points system. In our policies towards those countries, we could then take into account the human rights situation in the country concerned.

The Earl of Onslow: My Lords, I hope that if this country were under a severe tyranny—and I do not mean the half-hearted amateur effort that my present Government are making, I mean a really severe tyranny—I hope that I would be prepared to use violence. I hope that I would be prepared to risk my life to restore some of the things that we all hold good, including the right gently to pull the leg of the noble Baroness opposite. The noble Baroness, Lady Williams, has proposed the inclusion of a very sensible caveat, because some outside tyrannies are so awful that there is no way of dealing with them other than by internal rebellion, which, unfortunately, will always get nasty. All violence is nasty but sometimes it is justified. The Bench of Bishops will, I am sure, give me a lecture on St Augustine's "just war" because he said so. The baronage used to say that they had the right to rebel against the King when he cheated on them. That is all that the noble Baroness—I nearly said "my noble friend"; perhaps I actually mean it sometimes—Lady Williams of Crosby, was saying. Therefore I support her amendment.

The Lord Bishop of Oxford: My Lords, I, too, support the amendment, for the reasons so powerfully and cogently put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, and the noble Lord, Lord Judd. However, the amendment has been made necessary because of the very unsatisfactory definition in the 2000 Act. I hope that it will be possible, sooner rather than later, for the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, to finish his work and come before the House with a new definition of terrorism.
	I venture to suggest that the long tradition of Christian thinking, both about violence by the state and about violence against the state, alluded to by the noble Earl, Lord Onslow, has a great deal to offer in the way of clarity. Drawing on this long tradition, it would be necessary to make a distinction between a terrorist act, which is relatively easy to define, and a terrorist organisation, which is much more difficult to define, and which is made particularly unsatisfactory by subsection (1)(c) in the 2000 Act, which refers to the use or threat of action where,
	"the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause".
	That is all-embracing and quite rightly arouses the opposition of many Members of this House.
	If we drew on that tradition, I would want to define a terrorist act, putting it in non-legal, very simple language, as "an act of violence or threatened violence directed against unarmed civilians". I would define a terrorist organisation as "an organisation that (a) uses terrorist actions as a matter of settled policy, and, (b) uses violence of any kind, whether discriminate or not, against a regime where, in the judgment of the Government, there are non-violent means of bringing about change still available". That second clause makes quite clear that we must all recognise that political judgments are involved and different governments will make different kinds of judgments. That should not take away from the fact that it is relatively easy to define a terrorist act. I very much hope that we will soon get a better definition of terrorism, but meanwhile I believe that it is absolutely necessary to support this amendment.

Baroness Williams of Crosby: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, and I are trying to decide, at a distance, which of us is going to now speak. I think by order that it is my turn.
	I am extremely grateful to the Minister for the thoughtful and careful way in which she responds to amendments of this kind. As a long-standing political hand, I am very conscious that flaws in amendments are always the reasons given for finding them unacceptable. The noble Baroness has put forward the perfectly fair argument that, in her view, the amendment was framed in too broad a way. The trouble is, as noble Lords will appreciate, the Bill itself is framed in far too broad a way. If one reads the list of offences in Clauses 1, 2, 17 and many others, one sees that the range is simply incredible. It is rather frightening as a range of potential offences. So, with no wish to be out of order, my noble friends Lord Goodhart and Lord Thomas and I had to frame the amendment in a way that countered and met the width of the Bill itself.
	One other point that I would like to make very quickly—it is a point which was forcefully argued by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford and the noble Lord, Lord Judd—relates to what one might describe as the counter-effect of this kind of legislation. If you are someone who passionately believes in democracy and human rights and who wants to bring that to your benighted country, and if it is not obvious to a country like the United Kingdom so that it understands that and is on the side of your effort to establish human rights and democracy, bluntly, where do you look for help? To whom do you look for help? The answer is that there is not anyone to look to for help.
	A number of noble Lords made forceful, honest and very important remarks about the great difficulty of having no clear definition of "terrorism". The right reverend Prelate offered an ingenious definition and there is another wise definition in the High Level Task Force of the United Nations, with which the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, was so closely associated. In other words, there is not a shortage of fine definitions which means that we have to fall back on an area of vagueness.
	The final point I wish to make—this is why, I am afraid, despite what the noble Baroness has said, I shall be seeking the opinion of the House—is summed up in the Minister's perfectly reasonable answer to me that my noble friend Lord Carlile of Berriew QC would be looking into this issue and coming up with a definition in a year's time. Apart from the fact that that leaves a rather nasty gap of a year—in which, quite possibly, there will be prosecutions for offences conducted outside this country and against governments other than our own—I have another objection. It is not an objection to the evidently brilliant reputation of my noble friend but, frankly, to the thought that an expert and not Parliament itself should have the final voice on this kind of issue, which is about human rights, democracy and justice. I think Parliament should have that right. Parliament should express its opinion; and that opinion should then be brought before experts who are considering what to do.
	I am sorry that the noble Baroness did not feel able to respond to the enticements of the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland—which appeared to me to be overwhelmingly moderate—namely, that she should agree that the Attorney-General would have to take these matters into account. Given that she did not feel able to go even that far or to say that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, would also have to go that far, I shall have to take the—

Lord Bassam of Brighton: My Lords, in moving the amendment, I shall speak also to Amendment No. 72. They appear to have been degrouped in error, as they clearly belong to the same group. I shall deal with them as one.
	It should not take too long to go through these amendments since I think that they will be welcomed. Clause 20(7) makes it clear that references to
	"conduct that should be emulated",
	include descriptions of general types of conduct as well as descriptions of specific instances of conduct. For example, the provision means that a description of launching suicide attacks as conduct to be emulated is covered, as well as descriptions of launching suicide attacks against particular targets or at a particular time. I am sure that noble Lords will agree that this provision is useful. Similar wording can be found in Clause 21.
	Where there has been some disagreement is that some of your Lordships have suggested that it might be difficult to understand the expression,
	"conduct that is of a description of conduct".
	Although I am satisfied that the expression is entirely clear and perfectly comprehensible, I am as always happy to meet, as far as is possible, the concerns raised by Members of your Lordships' House. I am therefore pleased to move amendments which would replace the expression,
	"conduct that is of a description of conduct",
	with the expression,
	"conduct that is illustrative of a type of conduct".
	I am satisfied that this expression achieves the same effect as the original formulation, and I imagine that noble Lords will regard it as a clearer statement of what we want to achieve. I beg to move.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, then I shall not take long.
	The Government accept the position that has been brought about as a result of amending Clause 1. For the record, however, the Government believe that this is something to which we will have to return. As the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, has just indicated, and as your Lordships are well aware, the reference to glorification in Clause 1 has now been taken out. In its place, a new definition of "indirect encouragement" has been inserted into the clause.
	As this is Burns Night, I hope that I may be permitted to observe that the decision to remove the glorification provision might be taken as proof, were any needed, that, in the words of the poet, the best laid plans,
	"o' mice an' men Gang aft agley".
	I hope that noble Lords who hail from north of the Border will forgive my poor pronunciation. However, it is right and fair to alert the House that the Government have accepted the amendment technically but not necessarily in substance.

Lord Cameron of Lochbroom: My Lords, I should like first to compliment the noble Baroness on her remarkable ability to utter words familiar to a Scotsman on Burns Night and to do so in the appropriate manner. Perhaps it is something to do with her name.
	The amendment is concerned to ensure that, in Scotland, it is only the Lord Advocate or a procurator fiscal who may apply for a warrant extending detention, or for the extension of the period of such a warrant, and that the police in Scotland should no longer have the power to do so. Under Section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000, the maximum period of detention is 14 days, and only a police officer of at least the rank of superintendent may make applications for extension of detention or for the extension of the period of such a detention. In Scotland, the applications are made to a sheriff.
	The Bill extends the period of detention to 28 days, and introduces a senior judge as the judicial authority where the period of detention is sought to be extended beyond 14 days. On any view, it would clearly be inappropriate that a police officer in Scotland should make any application to a senior judge. Indeed, I understood that to be recognised when the Government accepted my amendment in Committee, adding the Lord Advocate to the list which now appears in Clause 23(2), which sets out four separate individuals to whom power is granted to apply for a warrant extending detention, or for the extension of the period of the warrant.
	The amendment's purpose is to ensure that proper recognition is given to the distinct framework of the criminal justice system in Scotland and the equally distinct responsibilities for criminal investigation between the Lord Advocate, as the prosecuting authority, and the police in Scotland. They are not identical to those which obtain in England, Wales or Northern Ireland.
	I touched on those matters in amendments that I moved in Committee, when I reminded the Committee that the Lord Advocate is the head of the system of prosecution and investigation of crime in Scotland, and that he has statutory powers to instruct the police in the investigation and reporting of crime under Section 17 of the Police (Scotland) Act 1967 and Section 12 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995. The Lord Advocate acts through Crown counsel and the High Court of Justiciary, the Supreme Court, and through procurators fiscal in the sheriff and lower courts.
	The Bill gives some recognition to the different framework and responsibilities within which the criminal justice system in Scotland operates, as compared with the system elsewhere in the United Kingdom. The Bill, for instance, requires that for prosecutions elsewhere in the United Kingdom, consent should be given to the institution of proceedings by the Director of Public Prosecutions or the Attorney-General, as set out, as we heard very recently, in Clause 19. I mention in passing that it is perhaps an oddity that the effect of an amendment that was proposed in your Lordships' House earlier would have imposed certain matters of discretion on the Attorney-General only, and would not have had an effect on the Lord Advocate of Scotland.
	The Minister explained in Committee on 7 December 2005 at cols. 735 and 736 that because of the structure of prosecutions in Scotland and the overall responsibility of the Lord Advocate for prosecutions, it was unnecessary to extend Clause 19 to include specific reference to the Lord Advocate. To take another example, in Clause 28, on search, seizure and forfeiture of terrorist publications and its application to Scotland, it is the procurator fiscal who makes the application for a warrant, not a constable as elsewhere in the United Kingdom. In Scotland the application is made to a sheriff, not to a justice of the peace, as elsewhere.
	When an amendment to the same effect was debated in Committee on 13 December 2005, I said in col. 1148 that I understood that even at present an application made under paragraph 29 of Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000, which provides for the applications for a warrant extending exemption, or for the extension of the period of such a warrant, was normally made to a sheriff by the procurator fiscal, with the assistance of senior police officers. Thus there would appear to be no difficulty in removing from the police in Scotland the capacity to seek a warrant extending detention, let alone further detention. It would also ensure—consistent with the general tenor of such legislation on the investigation and prosecution of serious offences, and which touches on the rights of individual citizens—that any application is made only after the Lord Advocate or one of his officials responsible for the investigation and prosecution of crime in Scotland, has independently assessed the appropriateness of the grounds for making such an application.
	I refer again to Clause 24(3) of the Bill, which sets out the reasons for the judicial authority to be satisfied that further detention is necessary before granting an application. It is arguable that those are the kind of reasons that should be considered by the applicant before he even goes before the judicial authority.
	In reply, the Minister said that the amendment,
	"would reverse the current arrangements under which police officers can apply for such extensions. We see no reason why we should reverse the existing situation or create an arrangement in Scotland which is different from that in the rest of the UK".—[Official Report, 13/12/05; col. 1149.]
	I have already pointed out that in the present Bill there are arrangements that are different from the rest of the United Kingdom. Another example can be found in the provisions for all premises warrants for England and Wales and Northern Ireland in Clause 26, and for Scotland in Clause 27.
	The Minister did not in her reply answer the point that I had made about what I understood to be the normal practice in Scotland. If at present it is the normal practice that the procurator fiscal makes applications under paragraph 29 of Schedule 8 of the 2000 Act, there can be no substantial difficulty in reversing the existing situation in Scotland. I would be grateful if the Minister will answer two questions, of which I have already given her notice. First, was my understanding of the normal practice followed in Scotland correct? Secondly, have police officers in Scotland made such applications independently of a procurator fiscal and in what circumstances did that occur? If they have never done so, that would appear to support the view that the arrangements in Scotland could be amended without difficulty and without doing any violence to the operation of the current or proposed arrangements for warrants extending the period of detention of terrorist suspects.
	In her reply, at col. 150, the Minister also indicated that she would ensure that the Lord Advocate had the benefit of reading Hansard. I look forward to hearing why the Lord Advocate considers that my amendment would in any way be detrimental to the operation of the provisions of the 2000 Act or the new provisions for Scotland in the Bill if, in fact, he considers that to be the case. This being Burns Night, I hope that the Minister will be able to give this a fair wind. I beg to move.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord for his compliment on my Scots. I think it was the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern—who I see is in his place—who made it plain when my noble friend Lady Kennedy of The Shaws and I were appointed on the same day to Silk that he had appointed one because he knew that she was a Scot and the other because he believed that she was one. I have thankfully taken some lessons.
	I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochbroom, for tabling Amendment No. 74. I am also grateful to him for the letter he sent to me setting out his interest in more detail. It is always helpful to be given advance notice of particular concerns and I hope I will be able to address each and every one of them.
	We have already benefited from the noble and learned Lord's careful scrutiny of the Bill and have made changes to it as a result of the assiduous way in which he has examined it. However, as I explained in Committee, these matters have been considered very fully with the Lord Advocate and he did not believe them to be necessary. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Cameron, has explained that he needs to feel assured that the Lord Advocate has read the Hansard account of the relevant debate. I can confirm that he has done so and is still of the same view. The Hansard account of the debate on 13 December 2005 is at cols. 1145 to 1150.
	The Lord Advocate has had the opportunity to consider the arguments put forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochbroom, but is still of the view that it would be inappropriate to accept this amendment. The Lord Advocate is grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Cameron, for his careful scrutiny of the Bill—and, on his behalf, I express that gratitude. He also has some sympathy with the noble and learned Lord's arguments in that the Lord Advocate is the head of the systems of prosecution and investigation of crimes and has statutory powers to instruct police in the investigation and reporting of crime under Section 17 of the Police (Scotland) Act 1967 and Section 12 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995. Despite this, under the existing provisions in the Terrorism Act, police officers can apply for extensions to detentions under Schedule 8 of the Terrorism Act in Scotland.
	In practice, because of the protocol that exists between the Crown Office and the Procurator Fiscal Service, on one hand, and the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland, on the other, applications are made only with the agreement of the procurator fiscal. They are generally signed by a police officer of at least the rank of superintendent, but the procurator fiscal will attend the relevant hearing with the police officer and will speak to the application. The Lord Advocate would like to retain the possibility that police officers might apply for extensions to detentions. He does not believe it would be appropriate to reverse the existing arrangements in this respect. In addition, the Lord Advocate is still of the view that it would be inappropriate to have different powers in Scotland from the rest of the United Kingdom.
	Finally, in the letter that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochbroom, kindly sent to me, he courteously asked me for figures to show how frequently the police apply for extensions to detentions under the Terrorism Act 2000. I can confirm that in 2005 in Scotland, four people were held for longer than 48 hours, of whom three were subsequently charged. The applications to extend the detention times were carried out in accordance with the protocol which I have described.
	I am most grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his ongoing scrutiny of the Bill. I hope he now fully understands why the Government prefer to allow the Bill to stay as it is, not least because we want to pay proper deference to the current Lord Advocate, who, after all, we rely on so fully in these matters. I hope the noble and learned Lord will concur with the current Lord Advocate's view. With that explanation, I hope he will feel content to withdraw his amendment.

Lord Imbert: My Lords, I recall clearly the debate in Committee in your Lordships' House on 13 December, particularly the part relating to Clause 23, when the noble Baronesses, Lady Ramsay and Lady Park, proposed that the 28 days agreed to in another place, whereby a terrorist suspect could be held in custody before charge or release, should be increased to 90 days as provided for in the original Bill. I supported their argument, which to me was highly persuasive. I have, however, now had the opportunity to study in depth the official Hansard report of that debate. While grateful to all noble Lords who gave strong support to the amendment, I noted with renewed concern the number who expressed their fears that the extension of a period of detention without charge for up to 90 days, albeit with rigorous judicial supervision every seven days, was a denial of the suspect's human rights. It might also be counterproductive and could lead to young Muslims, who felt that the proposed legislation was aimed only at them, seeking what they saw as martyrdom by becoming suicide bombers.
	I took note of noble Lords who said that three months detention without charge could be the trigger for further home-grown terrorism, although I was unhappy to hear that, in colloquial language, we were going "belly-up" for fear of alienation of a particular section of our society here in Britain and that, if we did so, the consequences might be dreadful. Much as I hate giving in to such implied threats, I acknowledge that a three-month detention period without charge, which mischief-makers might make use of at this time of heightened tension, might be used to stir up the passions of young Muslims. I have therefore informed my former professional colleagues that I cannot presently sustain my wholehearted support for their request for three months detention without charge.
	I certainly would not want the deaths of many innocent people on my conscience should the contention be correct that 90 days would lead to impressionable and vulnerable young Muslims sacrificing their own lives and the lives of others by carrying out suicide bomb attacks. But, having been told of the way in which young officers were sent down that darkened tunnel to collect body parts of those who no longer had any civil rights, my conscience would not be clear if I failed to support the request for an extension of what I see as an unworkable and dangerously unreasonable 14 or 28-day limit, if such a limit led to the release of suspected terrorists who subsequently became the purveyors of ghastly death and destruction of many innocent people.
	Let us not fool ourselves. We may not have seen anything yet in the way of terrorist outrages. The dreadful incidents so far may, I fear, prove at some time in the future to have been far less devastating than what is to come. I have no secret intelligence about that, of course, but I recall what my noble friend Lord Stevens said when he was Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police in his warning about terrorist plans. He said:
	"It is not 'if', it is 'when'".
	Some people in this country did not believe him. I have to admit that I hoped he was wrong: but he was shown in unspeakable and atrocious reality to be right. After the July attacks, many politicians and commentators made brave statements about how we would not be bowed and how we would prepare for and deal with terrorism. I wonder where that Churchillian spirit and determination has gone now.
	Just a few months after those July atrocities, and while some of their victims are still in hospital, we hear more about a suspected terrorist's civil rights than about an innocent person's right to life. As I said on 13 December, we are under threat. The steel barriers outside your Lordships' House will not save the lives of those travelling on public transport or attending a large spectator event if terrorists target them. Many noble Lords will recognise the comments of Edmund Burke—I hope that I am right in recalling that it was he who said it—that, "All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing". Are we to do nothing or next to nothing and admit to the public that our inaction was because we made a judgment and felt that the risk of alienating some British citizens and possibly denying them their civil rights, with the result that they or others might become suicide bombers, was greater than the risk of terrorist atrocities being committed by those who had not been so detained and investigated?
	Since the Committee debate some 43 days ago, in addition to studying the Official Report line by line—to which I shall return briefly—I have endeavoured to carry out my own social research—it is important that we know what the man in the street is saying—relating to the identification of suspected terrorists and how we should deal with them. To indicate the spread of that research, my informants have included, among many others, my Italian barber, the Cockney driver who sometimes gives me a lift to your Lordships' House, an Iranian minicab driver, my near neighbours, a well-spoken accountant from a Tory stronghold in a shire county, an east London Labour councillor and, perhaps most importantly, a Muslim lady shopkeeper.
	The noble Lord, Lord Condon, a valued former colleague of mine, in his contribution to the debate on 13 December gave us the meaning of the words "al-Qaeda". I had not known that and was most grateful but no one else to whom I spoke knew that translation. With one exception they all associated "al-Qaeda" with terrorism. The Iranian minicab driver said, "They are the people who are trying to drive us out of this country". He felt very strongly that terrorist acts when committed by Muslims would make more British people think that every Muslim was a terrorist supporter.
	The Muslim lady shopkeeper clearly saw this country as a beacon of hope for her and her family but felt that we might not keep it so as we were too soft on those suspected of terrorism or terrorist propaganda; and that unless we acted with firmness good Muslims would be driven from this country, which—in my words, not hers—she undoubtedly saw as a citadel of freedom for her and her children.
	Playing devil's advocate, I told my Iranian minicab driver that many people were fearful that if a person were to be detained for three months without charge, it would cause other young people to carry out terrorist acts. It was, however, his view, as it was of the others to whom I spoke, that the reasons for the terrorist attacks were that some people felt they were striking back because of Britain's involvement in the Iraq war, the continued occupation of that country by American and British troops and British support for Israel over the Palestinian question. He did not think that 90 days without charge to allow police to complete their inquiries would generate further hostility. He added, "It has got to be done to keep us all safe". My other informants had similar views and I will not repeat to your Lordships what my Cockney driver advocated should be done with anyone preaching terrorism, carrying out acts of terrorism or harbouring terrorists.
	The danger, I believe, is that others might take the same view, and if we are perceived by the general public to be doing little or nothing, then I fear that that in itself may have a harmful effect on community relations and the prospects for essential and highly desirable multi-faith and multi-cultural harmony.
	I said I would briefly return to the report of the debate in Committee on 13 December. Noble Lords who were present may recall that I gave examples of cases where investigations were complex and sometimes involved further inquiries in foreign countries—in one case in no fewer than 26 foreign jurisdictions. One of these examples was what I said had become known as the "ricin plot". Later in the debate I received a shrill challenge from the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, to have the courage to repeat outside the Chamber what I had said. She said:
	"Here he is covered by parliamentary privilege, but if he repeats it outside this Chamber, he may find that he is subject to litigation because there was no ricin. I repeat: there was no ricin".—[Official Report, 13/12/05; col. 1188.]
	I bring this to notice in case other noble Lords felt that I had hidden behind parliamentary privilege and had given misleading information to the Committee that ricin had been found. The noble Baroness was absolutely right—there was no ricin. I was aware that the noble Baroness knew much more about the case than I did, so I feared that I must have inadvertently misled your Lordships. Since suffering a stroke a few years ago I occasionally juxtapose words. I therefore checked my notes carefully. They showed that I had not said, or had not intended to say, that ricin was present. I respectfully refer the noble Baroness to columns 1163 and 1164 of the Hansard report of that day's proceedings for confirmation.
	Noble Lords may find it helpful to know how this came to be known as the "ricin case" in the first place. Information from my former colleagues shows that in January 2003 an original, handwritten Arabic manuscript, containing what appeared to be recipes for poisons and explosives, was recovered in a flat in Wood Green. One of the recipes appeared—and I emphasise the word "appeared"—to be for ricin. Scientists were asked to test the recipe and they stated that it was viable. To make ricin, certain ingredients and procedures are required. Some of these ingredients were recovered from the flat. Initial presumptive testing by scientists of a pestle and mortar which had been recovered from the flat in Wood Green indicated that the mortar contained ricin. However, more sensitive testing—including, I am told, DNA work—led scientists to the contra conclusion that there was no trace of ricin in the mortar. Noble Lords may now understand how this came to be known as the "ricin case", although, as scientific tests subsequently showed—and as the noble Baroness was quite right in pointing out—there was no ricin. Perhaps from now on it should be known as the "no ricin case".
	I bring this to your Lordships' notice because it shows how these exhaustive scientific procedures indicate the amount of time such tests can take—tests which might also help to clear suspects of the alleged offence. This case, unsurprisingly, ended in acquittal. Your Lordships will have gathered, quite rightly, that I returned to seek the views of my former operational colleagues who are charged with the difficult—nay, the impossible—task of keeping us all safe while working within the parameters of the present law. It would be quite wrong if, as a former senior police officer, I did not consult them. It would be even more inappropriate now to indulge myself in the civilised atmosphere of your Lordships' House by standing on the operational touchline and making their job even more impossible by throwing intellectual toilet rolls into the goal mouth.
	However much my former professional colleagues thought that the limit should be extended to 90 days, as did I, they now understand that this will not be agreed to in this Bill. I told them that there was an amendment to extend the period to 60 days, and sought their views. They said that anything beyond the present time restriction would be an improvement and would enable them to do their job more effectively. I recall that in the December Committee debate the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, said:
	"Further, work expands to fill the time allotted to it. If you give the police 90 days . . . they will take their 90 days".—[Official Report, 13/12/05; col. 1190.]
	I happen to trust our judges; I have not always agreed with them throughout my career but I trust them, along with members of the noble Baroness's own profession. I believe that they would be suitably robust, when looking at a case every seven days, to decide whether investigations were being carried out diligently and expeditiously.
	We have charged the police and the security services with the onerous task of helping us keep free from the scourge of terrorism. If anyone should think it is not a scourge, let them talk to those fire, ambulance and police personnel who were given the task of helping with the rescue of those who survived and the collection of body parts of those who no longer have any civil rights. Let us give our guardians at least the opportunity to do the job we so much rely on them to do. I urge noble Lords to support the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Sewel, that the time limit should be up to 60 days, with a review at least every seven days, thereby showing the public that we are carrying out our duty to maintain public safety in these terrifyingly threatening days.

Baroness Park of Monmouth: My Lords, I find it difficult to follow that moving speech. I support the amendment because 60 days is still a great deal better than 28. The arguments for more time remain the same, although more urgent. The two key problems which inhibit the chances for a charge being made within the time limit are the same. The pressure on insufficient resources is greater. There really is a very limited supply of people with the highly technical linguistic and decryption skills to extract from masses of complex material the necessary evidence—and it has to be evidence—to allow a charge to be formulated.
	If the police arrest four presumed terrorists, that will produce four sets of complex and sophisticated material. I shall be very surprised if there are four such teams available, particularly as they must work under great pressure and are meanwhile not available for other work. Indeed, the press this week reports an MI5 trawl through transcripts and video footage alone, which suggests that there has been a serious lack of resources there. They and the police both need people with specialised linguistic and decryption skills; they are both looking for needles in haystacks.
	Then there is the problem of the time needed to follow up clues in the international dimension which characterises the present terrorist threat. The IRA was a relatively domestic problem. Asking for answers from a foreign security service with its own agenda and own pace is not the same as checking with a domestic police force, where we can set the priorities.
	In a previous debate on this issue, the noble Baroness, Lady Symons, described convincingly the difficulty of following up leads abroad through friendly intelligence services, each with their own agenda, and most far less well organised than ours, in time before the detention period runs out. Suppose that the resources team finds a clue in the first week of detention, which leads abroad. At present, the police and the intelligence services have a maximum of three weeks after that and only if they have secured extensions after 14 days to follow up these inquiries. How practical is that? How can they possibly get the answer in two and a half weeks? Unless they can secure at least up to—it is always up to—60 days, there is a very real chance that the suspects will have to be released before the crucial evidence, if it exists, has been obtained.
	I want to quote the wise words of the late Lord Merlyn-Rees, whom we have so sadly lost, in Hansard on 13 December. He said:
	"We are talking as if 90 days is what all those who are arrested will have to undergo; and that is not the case. Most cases will be for a week or a fortnight . . . by going in front of a judge and saying what further evidence they have got or they would like to get hold of, they would then be likely to hold someone for longer".—[Official Report, 13/12/05; col. 1174.]
	If suspects have to be released before the follow-up of clues both domestically and abroad, the police then have to begin all over again and no-one, incidentally, will know whether the suspects were or were not innocent.
	Even up to 60 days would give the police and the security services at least a chance to find the evidence on which to base a charge. Does it make sense to ignore the advice of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, who believes that, given the role of a senior judge, 90 days is probably a practical and sensible option. I do not know whether he would settle for 60 days. He advocated, however, that more could be done in terms of a more searching system of control week by week to recognise the seriousness—and we do recognise the seriousness—of the state holding someone in high security custody for as long as three months.
	Returning to the main issue of proof and of the deprivation of liberty, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon recognised that:
	"In an age of international terrorism . . . the case for extending the period of detention without charge is formidable".—[Official Report, 21/11/05; col. 1422.]
	And arguing for earlier arrest and therefore a greater need for the burden of proof, he said that if the wrongdoer slipped the net before there is enough evidence to charge him it could be too late.
	Some of the opposition to 90 or even 60 days springs from the view that we are sending a hostile message to the whole Muslim community, and here I echo what the noble Lord said. We are told that it would be counter-productive as the present terrorist threat comes in the wake of the events of July last year. It is not unnatural that, at this time, we should relate our action to that sector of international terrorism. We are told that this will be counter-productive and encourage young men to martyrdom because those who advocate terrorism and challenge the values of the West will point to this provision—90 days—as illustrating why they must challenge our values and norms. But that is allowing would-be terrorists to set our national agenda. I am sure that law-abiding decent Muslim communities, who are as British as we are, would wish us to do all that is necessary to bring terrorists from whatever culture to justice and to protect the public of which they are part. It is not right for us to assume that in preventing a handful, though a deeply dangerous handful, of young people from taking to themselves the right to set our national agenda through terror, we are failing to show respect to the Muslim community, who are British themselves and by no means wish to become part of a worldwide Sharia state—certainly not through terror.
	Finally, I well understand and share the deep concern felt by many that in seeking this extension of up to—only up to—60 days, we are in danger of eroding our precious heritage of civil liberties, and especially the principle of innocent until proved guilty. I do not wish to do that; none of us does. There is, however, a sunset clause in this Bill which means that we can think again. In a year from now, or better still, two, there will have been time to increase to some extent the specialist resources without which the police will almost certainly be unable to find the evidence, if it exists, to make a charge or not. In that time it should be possible to create the further safeguards advocated by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, and Sir Swinton Thomas. Can it be right to deny the police, as 28 days will almost certainly do, the time to do their job, and yet to require them to start the hopeless process again with undiminished zeal as and when more suspects are identified? I urge the House to vote for up to, and only up to, 60 days, to be reviewed under the sunset clause, to give time for international checks to be made where necessary, but above all, for more resources to be built up.

Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale: My Lords, I support the amendment. Following an outstanding debate in this Chamber in Committee in December, on an amendment that I proposed, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Park, the noble Lord, Lord Imbert, and my noble friend Lord Foulkes, for pre-charge detention of up to 90 days—a debate described by the Minister at the time as one of the most extraordinary in this House for some considerable time—I think that the House is owed an explanation as to why we are not bringing forward such an amendment at Report but are supporting a provision that would allow detention of up to 60 days.
	The amendment is an attempt, after much consultation and consideration, to deal with the doubts of those noble Lords who genuinely feared that up to 90 days was a step too far or who did not feel that it was right to send back to the Commons something that had been fully debated and decided there. Because of Commons procedures, the amendment allowing detention for up to 60 days was never considered at all there. Personally, I would prefer to accept the advice on adopting 90 days from the counter-terrorism experts in the Met, ACPO and ACPO Scotland, as I am convinced by their arguments. Those arguments are summed up in the detailed and compelling seven-page attachment to the letter from Assistant Commissioner Hayman to the Home Secretary, which we have all seen—the points are very much echoed in paragraphs 57 to 60 of the report of the independent reviewer, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew. It is crystal clear to me that 28 days is totally inadequate to meet the current needs of our police and that, if Parliament would agree to up to 60 days, that would give them at least a better opportunity to deal with the time-consuming complexities that are now facing them.
	Standing here today, I feel very much the loss of two noble friends, for whom I had much affection and who were supporters of my amendment for 90 days in Committee—the much admired and respected Lord Merlyn-Rees and Lord Stratford, who was new to this House but a long-serving and distinguished parliamentarian. It is very sad that, for both of them, their interventions in support of that amendment on 13 December were their final parliamentary speeches.
	As I have said before, the complexity and difference in nature of the current terrorist threat demands complex and different responses from previous counter-terrorism measures in this country. The police have to move in to detain suspects at a much earlier stage than is the practice in other criminal cases, when suspects can be allowed to continue under surveillance so that evidence is accumulated. In the case of terrorist suspects, no one can dare to allow a case to run, as that would risk losing track of a suspect and enabling a terrible terrorist attack to take place. We are now faced by fanatics aiming for maximum havoc of death and injury, who are ready to sacrifice themselves to achieve it. Those people often have international links—organisational or individual—which have to be painstakingly traced through foreign liaison services of varying degrees of capability and resources, and even willingness, to co-operate. The suspects use advanced technology, often involving encryption, resulting in masses of material to be sifted and analysed.
	The provision of an adequate supply of technical experts as well as of interpreters and translators to deal with that huge volume of material all slows the process. As Assistant Commissioner Hayman has pointed out, it is not a question of resources alone, because the procedures—some of them inevitably consequential—will take time, a point that was echoed in the report of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. I cannot see how a maximum of 60 days of pre-charge detention, with a senior judge having to be satisfied every seven days that there is just cause for a further seven days' detention, would be an unjustified infringement of civil liberties, especially with a sunset clause in the Bill.
	For me the issue is clear and stark. We are faced with an extraordinary threat to our national security and those who are tasked to meet that threat have asked us for a longer pre-charge detention period, which they consider necessary for them to fulfil their responsibilities. They have made a cogent case, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, for more time in which to establish evidence. I will not repeat here the words that my noble friend Lord Sewell quoted in introducing this amendment, which he said were "chilling"—indeed they are. It is clear to me that 28 days is wholly insufficient and wrong. I urge the House to give the Commons the opportunity to consider 60 days, and to vote for this amendment tonight.

Lord Lloyd of Berwick: My Lords, I had not intended to intervene so early, but it may be helpful at this stage to hear the argument the other way. I did not speak on the subject of this amendment in Committee, but I was present throughout and listened with the greatest care to those who advocated, as they have today, an extension of the detention period from 28 days to either 60 or 90 days. They attached, as do I, great weight to the views of the Association of Chief Police Officers, but I do not think that anyone has suggested that the views of police officers in this matter are decisive. I think that everyone accepts that there is a balancing exercise between the safety of the public on one hand and, on the other, the fundamental rights of individuals not to be kept in custody for lengthy periods without charge. The noble Lord, Lord Sewell—in what was, if I may pay him this tribute, an excellent speech moving the amendment—made that very clear.
	That is the exercise in which we are currently engaged and I must explain why I attach less weight to the views of very senior police officers than others have done in this respect. I do not think that the point I am about to make has yet been made in these debates. If 90 days is the period that police officers now say they require for carrying out their investigations, why did they not say so when the very same question arose during the passage of the Criminal Justice Bill as recently as 2003? What senior police officers asked for then, and got, was an increase from seven days to 14 days. Why do they now say, only two years later, that 14 days is not enough and that they need 90 days?
	The reason cannot be that things have changed by what happened on 7 July. It is true that that was the first occasion when suicide bombers carried out operations in the United Kingdom, but surely the police must have foreseen the threat of suicide bombers in 2003. Indeed, the first British suicide bombers had already been involved in the attack on Tel Aviv in May 2003, so the threat must have been very much in their minds. Indeed, one may speculate that it was because of that attack by British suicide bombers in May 2003 that Clause 284 was included at the last moment in the Criminal Justice Bill of that year.
	Therefore, the advent of the suicide bomber cannot explain the change from 14 days to 90 days. Nor have senior police officers offered any other reason for the increase from 14 days to 90 days, because the reasons they now give are almost word for word those which they gave in 2003. I regret that I am driven to the conclusion—it is certainly the impression that I am left with—that the request for 90 days was simply a reaction to the events of 7 July, in the way in which one so often sees governments reacting to events of this kind, rather than a considered response to a continuing threat, which is what is needed when we are legislating against terrorism.
	My second point is that 60 days would have little chance—I would say no chance—of being acceptable under the provisions of Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It is bound to be challenged—let nobody doubt that. If it is challenged, the challenge will, in my view, succeed. No other country in Europe at the moment requires more than five or six days without charge. We are asking for 60 or, originally, 90 days without charge.
	The belief that a challenge under the Human Rights Act is almost bound to succeed is not my view alone. It was the view of the Joint Committee on Human Rights in its report on this very provision. It stated that a case had simply not been made to extend the period from 14 days, let alone to 60 or 90 days. In its view, it would be held that 60 days was not a proportionate response to the threat. Even more important were the views of Louise Arbour, which I quoted on the first day of the Report stage. I remind your Lordships that Louise Arbour is a distinguished Canadian judge who is now the High Commissioner for Human Rights. In her letter of 28 November, which many Members may now have seen, she stated her grave concern about how, if the period is extended beyond 28 days,
	"the rights guaranteed by . . . Article 5 of the ECHR will be protected".
	Those are views to which we really must pay attention.
	Reference has been made to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, but I remind the House that he said that more than 28 days would be acceptable under the Human Rights Act only if it were accompanied by a fundamental change in our criminal procedure. The Government were unwilling to accept that, however, as the noble Lord made very clear at Second Reading. It is very hard for me to imagine how anybody could put forward a case that 60 days would be acceptable under the Human Rights Act, which is, after all, an Act of Parliament to which we all agreed.
	It is easy to paint a picture of the devastation which was created on 7 July and it is easy to say that anything less than 60 days' detention would be, to use the expression of the noble Lord, Lord Imbert, "woefully inadequate". It is less easy for most of us to imagine what it is like to be held in custody, day after day, without being told the reason, and then to be released without charge after 60 days. Of course, if someone is guilty of something, they would know why they were being detained, but that begs the very question.
	The effect on the individuals concerned of being detained in that way, without discharge, is devastating, as is the effect on their families. I saw that when I visited Pentonville prison immediately after the outbreak of the first Iraq war. My job then was to go and see people in prison who had been detained on information from the Security Service. Yet it is not just about the effect on individuals; there is also the effect on community relations. That point was made in Committee by the noble Lord, Lord Condon, in what I can only call a wise and persuasive speech; I found myself in complete agreement with everything that he said.
	The safety of the state has always been used as a justification for undermining civil liberties. That does not happen overnight, but it will happen in the end, unless we are very careful.

Lord Clinton-Davis: My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, holds great affection in your Lordships' House. We also rejoice in his skill. But on this occasion, he is utterly wrong.
	There is no doubt that the events of 7 July had a tremendous effect in this country. As far as any challenge from the European Court of Human Rights is concerned, we should await the result of that before making any judgment. At present, we are at liberty to opt for 60 days, if we wish. The court has not pronounced an opposite point of view at the moment.
	We have heard some remarkable speeches against the amendment today, but they have not changed my opinion since our debate on 13 December. I am not sure, at present, whether 28, 60 or 90 days offers a complete solution to our problems. However, I have come down in favour of the middle ground—the 60 days. It is the most appropriate that we can have at present. Although the other place opted for 28 days, it is incumbent upon us, as has been said today, to give it an opportunity to consider the 60-day solution, if it can be called that, which, by virtue of a procedural situation, it could not debate. When we last discussed this matter, the view of some noble Lords was, undoubtedly, in favour of the 28 days. However, I respectfully suggest that the motivation was rather mixed.
	I care about civil liberties, but in my view the test should not be: "What do the police prefer?", but "What is most practical, having regard to fundamental civil liberties?". Nearly everyone participating in this debate is fallible, as I am, but in my judgment 60 days should enable a competent police force to assemble its case more readily than the 28 days which has been supported by another place.
	We are dealing here with a fairly new and different type of criminal. We cannot afford to take chances with people's lives. On the one hand, terrorists are increasingly sophisticated these days; internationally connected, and unconcerned about their personal consequences. On the other hand, our society would be ravaged if we permitted these factors totally to destroy our vision. Our concern for civil liberties is paramount but, at the same time, it is equable; no, that is not the right word. Like the noble Lord, Lord Imbert, I have had a stroke and cannot always remember the right word.

The Earl of Onslow: My Lords, nullus liber homo capiatur. I will go on in English, since we are not quite such a well-educated generation as we were—

The Earl of Onslow: My Lords, I applied that to myself, not just to other noble Lords.
	"No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or deprived . . . or outlawed or exiled or in any way ruined, nor will we go and send against him except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land".
	That is Magna Carta and that is fundamentally what we are talking about—the noblest of liberties. That clause inspired the writers of the American Declaration of Independence, and their constitution; that is what we are fighting for. If we go down the road of extending the locking-up of people without trial, we will qualify our own liberties.
	It is not as if the police have been phenomenally competent recently. They had—and the intelligence services had—knowledge of the people who blew up the bombs. There have been recent reports of enormous amounts of stop and search, as a result of powers used under the terrorism legislation. We have had no evidence that the actual powers needed must be extended from 14 days to 90 days. The noble Lord made that absolutely clear.
	Let us also bear in mind that horrid, beastly, brutal and disgusting though those attacks on the London Underground were, we are not going through the most ghastly of all terrorist occasions. Northern Ireland in the 1970s was certainly far worse, and they did not see the need for those extra powers then.
	We have a wonderful country, with wonderful liberties. We have a super place to live in. Therefore let us guard that with every ounce of our souls, because those liberties and that clause in Magna Carta are so important.
	I shall end by quoting Kipling on Magna Carta.
	"And still when mob or Monarch lays Too rude a hand on English ways, The whisper wakes, the shudder plays, Across the reeds at Runnymede. And Thames, that knows the moods of kings, And crowds and priests and suchlike things, Rolls deep and dreadful as he brings Their warning down from Runnymede!"
	Remember that, my Lords.

Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: My Lords, I hope it is not wishful thinking on my part to hope that some people who were uncommitted at the start of the debate will have been converted by that powerful argument.
	With no disrespect to the noble Earl, Lord Onslow, I think that rather than quoting Kipling, the more appropriate poet to be quoting this evening would be Robert Burns, as the Minister pointed out earlier. I searched through his collected works, but I could find very little about terrorism, so it is difficult to use him in that respect. I do not want to quote too much from the great bard, because I know from experience elsewhere that it causes problems for Hansard reporters. I shall give one quotation, which I use and think about a lot:
	"O wad some Power the giftie gie us To see oursels as ithers see us!"
	That gift was recently given to me through the power of the noble Baroness, Lady Lockwood, when she pointed out that, in Committee, perhaps my experience elsewhere had made me a little too strident, political and harsh when we were arguing about 90 days.

Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: My Lords, my noble friends are too kind. If I offended anyone on that occasion, I can only apologise. The reason, however, was that I feel passionately about this. I have genuine concern. That, perhaps, carried me away. I address that to my noble friends in particular, and to the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, for whom I have great affection despite not always sharing her views.
	The noble Baroness and I were concerned about the way in which the CIA played a part in the downfall of democracy in Chile, getting rid of Salvador Allende. I have been concerned about the way in which intelligence agencies gave support to the Contras in Nicaragua. Notwithstanding the impeccable credentials of the noble Baroness, Lady Ramsay of Cartvale, I am not always inclined to take the word of intelligence agencies. I have no reason to be unduly supportive of the police, some people here might recall. I accept what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick said: that we do not automatically accept what they say; but we have to give some weight to what they say. I share their concern that the terrorism which the Americans faced on 9/11 and we faced here in London last July is of a different order and type from the terrorism that we have seen in the past. Therefore, different powers are needed to fight it. They are trying to undermine not just our freedoms, but our whole way of life.
	That is why I have come around to the view that, for a very few—remember, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, said that it would be only one or two suspected terrorists of a particular type—more time is needed, subject always to that seven-day review by the judge. I say to my noble friend Lady Kennedy of The Shaws that each time it is reviewed after seven days, both sides are able to argue the case for continuation of detention or otherwise. That review by a senior judge is the safeguard.
	As the noble Baroness, Lady Ramsay of Cartvale, said, we had a very lively debate on the 90 days, with overwhelming support for it. We were right, however, not to move it on that occasion. We had to take account of the decision of the Commons, where it had already been rejected. However, 60 days—which is almost as effective as 90 days as far as the police and other agencies are concerned—was tabled by Janet Anderson in the Commons, but never debated, called or discussed. I know that she would like the opportunity to table it again. I know, from those I have spoken to in the Commons, that the Commons would like an opportunity to discuss it again. I think we should give them the chance to do so.

Lord Joffe: My Lords, in Committee, the debate on the corresponding section for 90 days was curtailed. I did not therefore have an opportunity to speak. Because of that, and because I think that I can add some new facts for your Lordships' consideration, I ask for your forbearance in talking, perhaps, a few minutes longer than I would normally expect to do on Report.
	There were many different, passionate views in Committee as to how the detention provisions of the Bill compared with the infamous 90-day legislation in South Africa. As I practised as a human rights lawyer in South Africa in the 1960s, and as most of my clients had been detained under the 90-day law, I can be of assistance to your Lordships in comparing that law with the detention provisions in this Bill, and in drawing attention to some of the lessons that could be learned from the South African experience.
	The 90-day legislation in South Africa was introduced at a time when the government feared that the ruling white population was in grave danger from the terrorists, and the police were under increasing pressure to prevent that danger. Broadly speaking, that was not unlike the position in the United Kingdom today. The legislation followed a series of less extreme rules, eroding the human rights of South African citizens with measures such as bannings and house arrest. Again, this is not unlike what has happened here over the past few years, where a series of similar laws—such as control orders, seven days' detention and then 14 days' detention—have eroded human rights.
	What is more, the key features of the South African legislation and the Bill are the same. Both allow for detention without trial. Both allow for the interrogation of the detainee through the period of detention. Both place the detainee in the hands of the police, who are authorised to move them from one location to another as they see fit.
	In implementing those laws, the South African police, protected by a colluding government and by most members of the judiciary, extracted information and confessions through savage, prolonged and relentless interrogation and denied access to the courts. Some confessed to crimes that they had not committed to be released from solitary detention and interrogation, and testimony from psychiatrists was that some detainees became so disoriented that no reliance could be placed on their statements to the police.
	I will not touch on the physical torture of detainees in South Africa as I do not believe that such torture is likely to happen here because of the safeguards in the Bill, and the right of access by detainees to lawyers, audio and video recording of interrogations and the requirement for senior judges to authorise the seven-day detention. There is also the Minister's reassurance that a separate code of practice for detainees will be introduced. While that is a source of comfort, the code will need to be carefully scrutinised because, as is often said, the devil is in the detail.
	While those safeguards should protect detainees against physical torture, the pressure of isolation and fear will remain. Experience in South Africa and elsewhere makes it clear that there will inevitably be abuse by some police officers, possibly accentuated by racism, which unfortunately exists to some extent in the police force. The greatest potential for abuse that the safeguards cannot effectively prevent will be the initial detention of innocent detainees.
	With regard to the proposed code of practice, will the Minister say whether the families of detainees will have access to them, whether detainees will be kept in solitary confinement and whether the police, after the 28-day original warrant expires, will be entitle to release and then re-arrest detainees for another 28 days, which was the procedure perfected by the South African police?
	In addition to the possibility of abuse, another key lesson from the South African experience is demonstrated by the legislation that followed the original 90-day legislation in 1963. In 1965—only two years later—new legislation extended the period of detention from 90 to 180 days. In 1967—only two years later—the law was extended to indefinite detention at the discretion of the commissioner of police. Each time the law was extended, the safeguards, such as they were, were watered down or removed.
	One is tempted to say that this just could not happen in the United Kingdom—

Lord Joffe: But, my Lords, it is chilling to note how closely our terrorism laws follow the pattern of the South African ones. In 2000, there was detention for seven days; in 2002—only two years later—seven days was extended to 14 days detention. In 2005—only three years later—detention for 90 days was proposed but was reduced in another place to 28 days. But for the reduction from 90 to 28 days, the trend line, if maintained, would have resulted in indefinite detention by about 2012.
	The initial 90-days legislation in South Africa met with considerable opposition in the South African Parliament. However, as the government, the police and the white population as a whole became attuned to the concept of detention without trial, subsequent legislation went through with almost no opposition. Helen Suzman—who ironically was appointed an honorary Dame of the British Empire because of her opposition to the laws eroding human rights—was the single MP who opposed the legislation.
	Fortunately, unlike in South Africa, there is still great opposition in our Parliament to 90 days and to 60 days The lesson that should be learnt from the South African experience is that legislation that erodes human rights should be addressed with the greatest care and deliberation. Where there is doubt—as there clearly is about the length of detention—such doubt should be resolved. We should err in favour of the law as it exists, remembering that the procedural safeguards in our law have been built up over centuries precisely because there can be no confidence in the operation of justice if those safeguards are not observed.
	It is correct to say that there may be risks in not going from 14 to 60 days or 90 days just as it could be argued that there may be risks in not immediately going to indefinite detention. But risks must be taken in defence of human rights and the rule of law, as is being demonstrated by the risks to which we are putting our Armed Forces in Iraq, in order to introduce democracy and the rule of law into that divided country. If there has to be a further erosion of human rights to protect the public, I would support an arbitrary 28 days rather than an arbitrary 60 or 90 days.

Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean: My Lords, I suspect that all of us are pretty familiar with the arguments around this issue of where the balance ought to lie between individual rights to liberty and the collective rights to security. However, I am bound to say that, unlike the noble Lord, Lord Joffe, I do not think that the situation in this country in 2006 is remotely like South Africa under apartheid. There is no white minority suppressing a black majority. Everybody over the age of 18 who is not in prison has a vote. We are all equal under the law. We have equal rights legislation, which protects us in respect of gender and race, and we now have religious protection for all. Our police are controlled by civil authorities who are elected by all the people of this country. Whichever party is in government, whether it is this side of the House or that side—or even the other side of the House—we live in a good and decent country. To draw the analogy with South Africa is a great shame.
	Like many others, I have enormous sympathy with those who support the argument for 28 days. None of us wants anyone languishing in custody who should not be there. All of us recognise the enormously powerful arguments of the noble Lord, Lord Condon, when we discussed this in Committee, about the risks of fracturing our society if we allow a situation to develop that can adversely affect a particular group of our citizens.
	I am sure that each of us has struggled with what we believe is right. When I first became a Minister in the Foreign Office I remember the principles that guided the decisions that all Ministers have to take when dealing with matters that impinge on international affairs. The truth is that the first duty of any state is the security of its citizens. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, said that it was an argument about security of the state. Not for me. It is an argument about the security of people—not the security of state institutions, but the security of real people.
	Security is not the only duty. The promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law are all vital—I use that word advisedly. They are vital, but governments, democracy, human rights and the rule of law do not flourish without proper security. Security is the first prerequisite, without which all those other vital components do not take root, and certainly do not flourish.
	As the noble Baroness, Lady Park, remarked, I spoke in Committee about my experiences in dealing with these issues as a Minister, and about dealing with other jurisdictions, which are sometimes very different from our own, and when time to argue cases over individuals is vital. I shall not run though those arguments now, but they are compelling. It takes a great deal of time, even when dealing with a friendly jurisdiction, let alone one that is a little less friendly than it might be.
	The noble and learned Lord, Lord Berwick, said that it was easy to paint the picture of 7/7, but that it was less easy to picture the misery of those who are held without charge for 60 days. I found that equivalence entirely misplaced. A lost life is a life lost for ever. Sixty lost days are, indeed, dreadful when they are lost unfairly. But it is 60 days, not 60 years. Furthermore, the 60 days are reviewed every seven days, unlike 60 years of a lost life which will never be reviewed at all.
	The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, said that there is no other country that uses this period of detention. I am sure that he is right. As I understand it, however, there are other jurisdictions where individuals are charged with minor offences and held for lengthy periods while the authorities draw together the evidence for the substantive charges of terrorism that follow. I wonder whether the noble and learned Lord really does believe that somebody languishing unfairly for 60 days with a review every seven days is treated so much worse than somebody held on a minor charge that everybody recognises is an artificial charge while the substantive charges are drawn together.
	The noble and learned Lord went on to ask why ACPO did not make these points in 2003. I cannot answer that because I do not speak for ACPO. But I know that in the past two and a half years our experience of dealing with terrorism has developed enormously. We have recognised the problems of dealing with foreign jurisdictions that I indicated when we last discussed this and we recognise those far more clearly. My practical experience was in the years 2003 to 2005. My position is not—as the noble and learned Lord indicated that he thought ACPO's position was—a reaction to 7/7, because my ministerial experience ceased before that date.
	I do not believe that if the terrorists who attacked this country on 7/7 had had the opportunity to kill hundreds or thousands they would not have taken it; they certainly would. Our first duty here, as legislators, is to the innocent people of all races and all religions. Nobody has spoken about their human rights and their right to life. That right has to take precedence here. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, was quite right when he used the words "fundamental rights". The right to life is the most fundamental of all. I believe that our first duty is to keep those people safe. It is not to take risks with their safety. We have a better chance of doing that by supporting the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Sewell than we do by sticking with 28 days.

Baroness Elles: My Lords, I support very much the speech made by the noble Baroness, Lady Symons. As she knows, terrorism now is not just in Northern Ireland by Northern Irish citizens or Irish citizens or in England just by English citizens. It is an international terrorism that we have to fight. We must take the necessary measures against people who allow their own co-terrorists to be killed as suicide bombers while they themselves live in luxury in a completely different part of the world. We should be supporting the amendment tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Sewell and Lord Imbert. I shall mention only one point: the problem that it can take up to 60 days to decrypt messages. Terrorists are using complicated systems to converse with each other across the world. How can you put somebody on charge within 28 days when you cannot get the evidence and when you cannot get even the opportunity of applying for up to 60 days in order to do so? I support the amendment.

Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws: My Lords, I was delighted to hear that Rabbie Burns was to be the poet of the day, given that his birthday is tomorrow. I was surprised that my noble friend Lord Foulkes did not find anything pertinent to this debate. It is true that there is no reference to terrorism, but there is reference to the rights of man. In the poet's work there is a great poem called "A Man's A Man For A' That". In it, Burns says very rude things about Lords, I am afraid. In fact, he says:
	"Ye see yon birkie, ca'd a Lord",
	and says some very unprepossessing things about the word birkie, meaning a fool. I do not know who he might have been referring to, and whether there is anyone who would fall under that description in this House. But he had a low opinion of Lords because he felt that we should not value Lords any more than anyone else when it came to the issue of rights.
	Burns was actually taking up the work of Tom Paine. We should be very proud of the fact that human rights had their beginnings here in Britain, in our culture and within our legal framework. The common law has always espoused human rights. So, when we talk of them, they are not some foreign import but something deep in the bowels of our own system. My noble friend Lady Symons says that we are debating the great balancing act between individual rights to liberty as distinct from collective rights to security. All I would say is that individual rights to liberty inevitably are about our collective rights too, because liberty is precious and important to all of us not only as a community but as individuals.
	In this debate we are looking at the abandonment of something very important—the necessary protections of liberty. It is right that when exceptional circumstances arise, such as terrorism, we may have to look again. But in the past few years, since September 11th, we have seen a quadrupling of the previous extended provisions for dealing with terrorism. A period of seven days is exceedingly greater than the period that we apply in normal crimes. As your Lordships know, the period of seven days was extended in 2003, not very long ago, to 14 days. Now it will be extended to 28 days. We have already seen the period multiplied fourfold. In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Condon, who has great experience as a police officer, said that we should see how that goes before we start leaping in to holding a person for three months.
	I ask noble Lords to bear in mind that, around the world, we are looked to as regards this business of liberty and how precious it is. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, mentioned, Louise Arbour, who is now the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights, sent a letter to our Ambassador to the United Nations raising deep concerns about this legislation. She was a Supreme Court judge in Canada and before that a prosecutor at the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague. She knows the law from all sides. She pointed out how this matter affects human rights issues around the world, for we are at the forefront in saying to the world that standards have to be set even when dealing with what people call terrorism. We know that as soon as we give sanction to the ready detention of people in places such as Zimbabwe, Putin's Russia or Uzbekistan because they are terrorists, we are giving licence to worse being done. We will be pointed to as leaders in this field. We therefore have to do this with great caution, not only because we are concerned about the safety of our own country but because we are concerned about the safety and standards in our world. We should take that seriously.
	I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Imbert, for correcting information that he gave to the House about the alleged conspiracy concerning ricin. All those who were charged were acquitted. In correcting him by pointing out that it was not a ricin trial because of those acquittals, I was asking him to correct the impression that an extension of time would have allowed for further investigation and might have created a different outcome. That is not the case.
	There was no issue concerning extended times in that case where it might have made the difference. He gave the example of someone being granted bail and leaving the jurisdiction before proceedings taking place. The impression may have mistakenly been given that granting bail was related to time limits. It was not. The concern that I have is that we have no evidence on which to say that extended time limits would have made any difference to any of the cases that we have so far dealt with. So I return to what the noble Lord, Lord Condon, said, which is that we are here about to do something radically different in the protection of citizens. We are about to remove the normal standards and to detain people for 28 days. Let us see how that goes before we do something as damaging to our legal system and to the rights that we all hold dear by extending this to 60 days. So I ask that we proceed with caution because the whole issue of liberty is so precious to us all and we should go with care and with concern for what the outcomes might inevitably be.

Lord Condon: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Sewel set out most eloquently and fairly the case for the amendment today. He equally fairly said that there are no right or wrong answers in this debate. It is ultimately a question of judgment and that is a judgment that we all exercise, I hope, sooner than later this evening. I will add briefly to the comments I made in Committee. We are talking about a small number of cases here. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, who is not in his place, said that perhaps in one or two cases the detention up to 90 days would be beneficial. If we grant detention beyond 28 days, we will not be giving the police or the intelligence services a greater chance of preventing another act of terrorism, because by definition this will only come into play once an arrest has been made and a potential act of terrorism has already been interdicted. So what is at stake? In one or two cases, do we want the police and the prosecutors to have a slightly better case of ensuring a prosecution? That is what the battleground is about. My concern is that for the sake of increasing the chance of one or two prosecutions, we are sacrificing some very fundamental human rights. That is what is at stake and that is the judgment you will make. My judgment is that I am not prepared to take that risk at this stage because the battle against fundamental Islamic terrorism is a battle that will last for decades and perhaps even centuries. It is a battle for hearts and minds as much as for one or two prosecutions. So although I respect all the noble lords who have spoken so eloquently in favour of the amendment, at this stage I will find difficulty in supporting it.

Lord Thomas of Gresford: My Lords, in this extremely important and interesting debate, we have had the personal experience of the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, at a time when he was engaged in curbing terrorist activities in Northern Ireland. He has emphasised to your Lordships the importance of working alongside the population and how the introduction of detention without trial undermined that critical weapon that he had in his armoury. We have just heard from the noble Lord, Lord Condon, with all his experience as Metropolitan Police Commissioner, who has told your Lordships that we are sacrificing some very important human rights if we go along this road. The noble Lord, Lord Joffe, has told us of his personal experience of the effects of the 90-day law in South Africa. You cannot beat these experiences that have been told to us today from the point of view of persuading us what course we should take. I simply want to address one aspect of the case where I think some of your Lordships may be a little misled. The noble Lord, Lord Imbert, when he spoke on 13 December, said:
	"To allow 14, or even 28 days, for a major and complex inquiry is woefully inadequate".—[Official Report, 13/12/05; col. 1164.]
	Today, the noble Baroness, Lady Park, asked whether that period of time was practical. The noble Baroness, Lady Ramsay, said that it is totally inadequate to meet the needs of the police.
	I would entirely agree that if an investigation were to be crammed within 14 or 28 days, it would be "totally inadequate". But a police inquiry does not begin with the arrest of an individual and end with the charge. These are important moments within a spectrum of activity which starts with the initial suspicion that begins the inquiry. It would be highly unusual for a suspect in a terrorist case to be arrested immediately after the suspicion first arose. An arrest would be unlikely to be triggered by an anonymous phone call. If the police hear that a person may be a terrorist, they are naturally anxious to build up a case and to find out with whom he is in contact and what the tendrils are of any conspiracy that there may be. So by adopting methods of surveillance: by bugging his home and car and monitoring his telephone and e-mail traffic, they will obtain evidence.
	They may very well make the sort of inquiries abroad that the noble Baroness, Lady Symons referred to. The concept of making inquiries abroad within a 14-, 28-, 60- or 90-day period is quite impossible. It obviously cannot be done. But inquiries are made abroad before arrest and they are made after arrest, to fulfil that type of inquiry. Arrest of a suspect obviously brings these investigations by way of surveillance to a full stop. But it also gives certain rights to a suspect—rights to consult a lawyer—and in the short period that elapses until he is charged, when he is interrogated, an opportunity for him to give his side of the case. When he is charged he has the right to know exactly what is said against him.
	Although arrest prevents surveillance and evidence of that sort, it does give an opportunity, for example, for specimens of blood to be taken from which DNA can be extracted; for taking fingerprints; and for obtaining other important scientific data. There may be searches of premises that are associated with him, which will produce reading matter, documents, hard disk drives, perhaps chemicals and even explosives. And there will be interrogations. Specimens will be forwarded to the appropriate laboratory for examination and analysis. This is not done within a 14 or 28-day period. It is a continuing investigation. Arrest and charge have different implications from placing boundaries around the police operation. No-one can be arrested unless there are reasonable grounds for suspicion—that is a basic principle. A person suspected of an offence must be immediately cautioned. It is interesting to look at the provisions of code G on caution. Code G states:
	"There must be some reasonable objective grounds for the suspicion, based on known facts or information which are relevant to the likelihood the offence has been committed and the person to be questioned committed it".
	Those are the directions given to the police. Do not arrest until you are at that level of investigation. The suspect is taken to the police station, he is told his rights, and he is then interrogated.
	Charging, which follows interrogation, is in serious cases the responsibility of the Crown Prosecution Service, which will consider whether there is enough evidence and whether it is in the public interest. If there is enough evidence, it must charge. It cannot keep a person in custody without charging him if it has sufficient evidence. It follows that if a person is held in custody without charge, there is not sufficient evidence against him to make a case, and if a person is to be detained for 60 days without charge, it is because at no time during that period is there enough evidence to charge him.
	The point was made that questioning must stop on charge. That is not correct; questioning may continue if it is in the public interest, for the prevention of harm to the public. Noble Lords should have in mind the spectrum from the beginning of an investigation all the way up until the trial; arrest and charge are merely important incidents on that spectrum. We are all agreed—are we not?—that imprisonment without trial is the weapon of the tyrant.
	The Supreme Court in the United States said in June 2004:
	"The point at issue in this case is nothing less than the essence of a free society. If this nation is still attached to the ideals symbolised in its flag, it must not use the weapons of tyrants to resist an attack by the forces of tyranny".
	We must not introduce imprisonment without trial in the face of the forces of tyranny.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, yet again, we have had an extraordinary debate in which there have been some very powerful speeches. I reassure the noble Lord that when the Government put forward the 90 days proposal it did so because, on the evidence placed before them from all sources, that was the Government's view on the most appropriate response that should be made to keep this country safe. The evidence was powerful; it was referred to extensively in Committee. Today we have had it highlighted once again in some very powerful speeches, not least that of the noble Lord, Lord Sewel, who opened the debate in an exemplary manner.
	Noble Lords who have said that there is no one perfect solution to the conundrum in which we as a nation find ourselves are quite right. There is a huge debate, a proper debate on where the line should be drawn between the security and safety of our people as a nation and the rights and freedoms that we as individuals have rightly come to expect. All those voices that have argued that individual freedom should not be capriciously or inappropriately curtailed are right. That principled approach has been maintained in the stance taken by the Government. This Government, contrary to what some may assert, have been unfailing in their adherence to the rule of law and to the promotion of individual civil liberties. We have seen that in the introduction of the Human Rights Act, the data protection legislation, freedom of information legislation and many other provisions that have been brought forward under this administration. I hope no one in this House doubts that the Government have taken these issues very, very seriously indeed.
	We also take into account the concerns that have been so powerfully expressed by my noble friend Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, among others, and the words of the noble Lord, Lord Condon. However, we know from the evidence that we have that it would be right to look at practitioners such as the Assistant Commissioner, Andy Hayman, who, as the most senior anti-terrorist police officer, has the current onerous responsibility of discharging, on behalf of our country, the security investigations that are necessary to keep us all safe. That evidence is powerful and cogent.
	The Government, as your Lordships know, argued strongly in the other place that 90 days was the appropriate time for investigations to take place. Taking on board the things that were said by a number of my noble friends, not least by my noble friends Lady Symons and Lady Ramsay and others, that is to be reviewed appropriately every seven days. However, the other place spoke. It did not agree with the proposals put forward by the Government. In the other place, my right honourable friend the Home Secretary undertook that the Government would not seek to overturn that decision and I do not resile from that tonight. This side of this House has a free vote. Your Lordships will have to decide how that is exercised. Noble Lords opposite will take their own course. I should make it plain that I and those who sit on the Government Front Bench will not vote on this matter. We will abstain.
	I shall answer a few questions that have specifically been raised with me. There was the suggestion that the provisions now before your Lordships are simply a response to the events of 7 July. I make it plain that they are not. Noble Lords will remember that we had a number of debates before 7 July when these issues were contemplated and we agreed that we would bring forward legislation as soon as reasonably practicable to consider these matters. We also argued on a number of occasions that the circumstances in which we found ourselves in 2005 were very different from the circumstances that had prevailed two or three years earlier and that we would need to respond creatively to those changes. The Government would argue that the proposals that we put forward are proportionate and right.
	I reject absolutely any suggestion that this country and what we have done could properly and fairly be compared with the situation that prevailed in South Africa.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for that very generous acknowledgement. I say to him that even in terms of the 90 days, the comparison cannot be made because here we have the Human Rights Act and we have a vibrant and robust judiciary which has demonstrated time and time again its resilience, courage and independence and it has not hesitated to disagree when it felt it was appropriate.
	I say to the noble Earl, Lord Onslow, that unfortunately I fundamentally disagree with him on the comments that he made about the way which our police forces have responded in these very difficult times. We need to honour what they have done on our behalf. The strenuous efforts that they have made, and continue to make, make this country a safer and securer place than if we had many of the police constabularies that other countries have. I say as strongly as I can on behalf of the Government that we thank and applaud the police for the efforts that they make on our behalf.
	It is now for the House to determine what stance it wishes to take on these matters. The House should understand that the Government's position was that the 90 days was the right balance.

On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 77) shall be agreed to?
	Their Lordships divided: Contents, 108; Not-Contents, 210

Baroness Park of Monmouth: My Lords, the House has spent many hours debating how best to counter the threat to our country that may arise from the acts of individual terrorists, particularly those who are part of, sustained and even created by international terrorist groups. We have been trying to counter the attacks through the front door and forgetting the back. The noble Baroness, Lady Cox, who has had more direct experience than most of us of contemporary terrorism in, for instance, the Sudan and Indonesia, is not able to be here. She has shown us the threat at the back door and in the basement.
	It cannot make sense for two firms to be responsible between them for such a comprehensive group of our most sensitive national institutions—Parliament, MoD bases, 11 nuclear power stations, British Airways, Texaco and so on. It is an additional cause of concern that these two particular firms are owned by a man with known and close links with a militant Islamic African country, the Sudan. But we ought, I suggest, be concerned whoever the owner is. This is too much power concentrated in one place. The elaborate protective devices installed round this House make little sense if we have a potential long-term unidentified enemy within.
	Nevertheless, we can hope for a statement from the Government about this issue. I suggest that we should not neglect the potential enemy or allow unfettered access and more control to two firms only. We should not do that; that is asking for serious trouble. I believe that we ought to have some sort of commitment that an inquiry and review will take place to establish effective safeguards, and preferably that the present monopoly will be broken. I fully recognise that this is far too delicate a subject on which to expect any further answers, but I do hope for that.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, I rise to speak to amendments nos. 86, 87 and 88. They are all minor technical amendments, and I beg to move.

The Duke of Montrose: My Lords, it is with some trepidation that I find myself standing here talking on a Northern Ireland order, conscious of the expertise of so many on this subject. When I saw that the subject was discrimination I was in even greater trepidation, but luckily, as the Minister has pointed out to us, it is a kind of discrimination about which we are all agreed legislation of the nature he has proposed should be put in place. We have no objections to this.

Lord Laird: My Lords, I rise today to join in the general approbation for this order. I identify with a lot of the remarks made by the noble Baroness, Lady Harris of Richmond. This is a good order, and it is well accepted. We are pleased about it in the group to which I belong, and we think it will make an impact.
	There are a number of little issues which the Minister might helpfully explain to us. As detailed in the Explanatory Memorandum for the order in relation to duties placed upon district councils and their members, certain matters are excluded from the remit of Section 15(b). These include appointments to offices or committees. Will the Minister expand on this and clarify why these matters are exempt?
	 Will the Minister also clarify in what circumstances can discrimination by public authorities be justified, as prescribed in paragraph 20 of the Explanatory Memorandum?
	Article 14 of the order, which refers to discrimination in relation to theletting of premises, includes an exemption relating to small dwellings, whereby a landlord or manager may justify less favourable treatment or a failure to take reasonable steps. What circumstances would be considered justifiable? Article 14, dealing with discrimination in relation to the letting of premises, requires the landlord or manager to "take reasonable steps". How is that defined?
	Section 21D(4)(c) allows public authorities an exemption from equal treatment of disabled persons if the case would involve substantial extra cost. Does the Minister have any plans to provide a transparent system which requires public authorities to publish details of how and when they use this exemption?
	Article 18 removes the requirement that a mental illness "must be clinically well-recognised" before it can satisfy the mental impairment requirements of the Disability Discrimination Act. How does the Minister propose to monitor the application of this liberalisation of the requirement? With those three questions, I have no hesitation in supporting the order.

Lord Maclennan of Rogart: My Lords, I, too, on behalf of these Benches, thank the Minister for the care with which he has set out these somewhat complex legislative provisions. The benefit to posterity in being able read and understand what may otherwise be rather opaque is undoubted. The purpose behind the first of these two transfers of authority seems entirely welcome, extending the operative effect of the management of the amendment of the 2004 Act to include reference to civil partners in the list of potential beneficiaries of firefighters. If this is required to achieve the change in time, then it is welcome.
	I am not entirely clear that I have followed the question of the noble Duke, the Duke of Montrose, about the basis of the provision stemming from an Act that had been amended, since I understood that the order was being made under Section 63 of the Scotland Act. I may, however, have simply not succeeded in following his undoubtedly careful thoughts.
	I am pretty close to having been baffled by the substance of the second part. I am hugely reassured to learn from the Minister that it will have the beneficial effect of helping to reduce methane from cows in Scotland. That must be seen as a not insignificant contribution to tackling climate warming, which I dare say will cause at least one or two Saltire flags to be hung out.

The Duke of Montrose: My Lords, I thank the Minister for the exemplary way in which he has explained these rather complicated and involved orders for the far north of this land. In addressing the Gaelic Language (Scotland) Act 2005 (Consequential Modifications) Order 2006, I must declare an interest as I was introduced as a very small boy of about two years old to life-long membership of An Comunn Gaidhealach, the organisation promoting Gaelic.
	The Minister was right to tell the House that this measure is simply to replace a bord with one name with another that is not dissimilar. He hinted that there are some crucial differences, which are explained in the explanatory memorandum. Bord Gàidhlig na h'Alba was established as a company limited by guarantee, but because of the Gaelic Language (Scotland) Act 2005, the Scottish Executive have now been able to institute the new Bord na Gàidhlig with statutory powers. With the use of the Education and Training (Scotland) Act 2000, they have has power to ask local authorities to prepare a strategy for Gaelic education in each area. Having spoken to someone in their offices, they seem conscious that this will be more appropriate in some areas than in others. I hope that they will pursue that with some sensitivity.
	I believe that there are about 90,000 Gaelic speakers of at least moderate fluency in Scotland. That represents a slight increase in recent years. The board to which they will be appointed, Seirbheis nam Meadhanan Gàidhlig—the Gaelic Media Service—has the power to produce Gaelic programmes and to hold broadcast licences with the intention of establishing a Gaelic channel. It was very useful that the Minister gave us some details on that because, with the advent of digital broadcasting, this is more feasible than it was a few years ago. The House should be aware that when that body was set up by the Conservative government in 1992, £9.5 million was provided. That funding exercise has now been delegated to the Scottish Executive, but currently that body is receiving only £8.5 million. A study by Deloitte has recently estimated that the cost of establishing a channel broadcasting for one and a half hours per day with a sustaining service would be £16.8 million. Noble Lords interested in these matters will be aware of what a great lift has been given to the Welsh language by the establishment of the Welsh-language channel S4C, which has a similar level of programme production to that proposed for the Gaelic channel. I was pleased to hear the Minister giving us some dates and proposals because the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages was signed by the British Government in 2001. Is the Minister satisfied with the rate of progress and the definitive programme that has been given?
	Moving on to the Charities and Trustee Investment (Scotland) Act 2005 (Consequential Provisions and Modifications) Order 2006, we can agree that there has been a need for better oversight of charities in Scotland. The setting up of the Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator is the method that the Scottish Executive have chosen to do that. By this instrument, the Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator is deemed to be a non-ministerial office in the Scottish administration. I am grateful to the Minister for explaining to the House that the board of that organisation will be held accountable to Scottish Ministers, as that was not entirely clear from the wording of the order.
	We in this House have spent many hours recently dealing with major legislation to regulate charities, the Charities Bill, which is now in another place. The Minister is no doubt aware that the critical determination of a charity under that Bill is expressed as the "public benefit test". I understand that there are somewhat similar criteria under the Charities and Trustee Investment (Scotland) Act, but those criteria are different. Will these raise an issue for Scottish charities operating in England, or for English charities operating in Scotland? Will there be any need for charities to achieve registration separately in both halves of the United Kingdom? I am pleased otherwise to agree to these measures.

On Question, Motion agreed to.
	House adjourned at twenty-four minutes before nine o'clock.
	Wednesday, 25 January 2006.